In recent time, the Government of Liberia established the Yellow Machines Board of Authority (YMBOA) to oversee the operations and management of the government’s fleet of heavy-duty road construction equipment.
By Emmanuel Nyonneo Newton, contributing writer
While the acquisition and deployment of these machines signals a commendable commitment to improving Liberia’s road infrastructure, the creation of a separate board to manage them raises legitimate questions about policy design, institutional efficiency, and long-term sustainability. As an interested observer, I find myself asking a simple but important question: Why not the Ministry of Public Works? As a disclaimer, this concern is not rooted in opposition to the initiative itself. Rather, it reflects a broader policy question about institutional efficiency, accountability, and sustainability in Liberia’s governance system.
On its face and without an ounce of doubt, the initiative appears timely and necessary. Yet beneath this appealing surface lie several questions that deserve careful public scrutiny. Liberia’s road infrastructure remains one of the most significant obstacles to economic development, rural connectivity, and access to essential services. From farmers struggling to transport produce to markets, to communities cut off during the rainy season, as well as a community stranded to get a pregnant woman to a nearby clinic or hospital; as such, the need for improved road networks is undeniable. In that sense, the acquisition and deployment of heavy-duty road construction equipment should be welcomed as a positive step toward national development and a long-lived relief to our collective survival.
The Ministry of Public Works (MPW) is the government agency legally mandated to oversee road construction, public infrastructure development, and engineering services throughout the country. Over the years, the Ministry has served as the central authority responsible for planning, supervising, and implementing road-related projects. Unless this has changed but to the best of my recollection the MPW has resident engineers for the 15 counties of Liberiato solely champion and cascade the policy mandate of the Ministry of Public Works. Given this clear statutory mandate, it is reasonable to ask why the operations of the yellow machines could not have been integrated within the Ministry’s existing institutional framework. So, to me, creating a separate Yellow Machines Board while the Ministry of Public Works already exists makes a paradox of great proportions to comprehend. Normally, when governments create parallel structures to perform functions already assigned to existing institutions, the result is often fragmentation rather than efficiency and relief. Rather than strengthening the Ministry’s operational capacity through additional funding, equipment, and technical expertise, the creation of a new board risks establishing an additional layer of bureaucracy between policy decisions and implementation, especially, in a country where public resources remain limited. Thus, setting up boards, committees, and special structures should not be justified whatsoever. The familiar cliché that history is the best teacher is particularly relevant in this instance. Since 2006, Liberia’s experience offers a clear pattern of well-intentioned yet often politically overzealous presidential initiatives that have struggled to endure beyond the administrations that created them. While these initiatives were often launched with strong ambitions as the yellow machine, many eventually oscillated due to institutional overlap, funding constraints, or shifts in political leadership. Considering all these unpleasantpast missteps, there is strong reason for concern that the proposed Yellow Machines Board may follow a similar trajectory.
For example, during the administration of former President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee was established to coordinate reconstruction and donor-funded development projects following the country’s civil conflict. The committee initially played an important role in coordinating national recovery efforts. However, as Liberia moved beyond the immediate reconstruction phase, many of its functions overlapped with existing ministries and development agencies. Over time, the structure gradually lost prominence.
Similarly, several agricultural and rural development programs launched in the post-war period particularly those aimed at expanding smallholder production struggled to sustain momentum after initial enthusiasm faded. In many cases, machinery and facilities provided under these initiatives fell into disuse because there was no durable institutional framework responsible for their long-term management. To simply put, all these did not fit into the larger government framework of continuity.
Even youth employment and community infrastructure programs introduced under successive administrations, including that of former President George Manneh Weah often produced short-term results but faced sustainability challenges once the initial political and financial momentum declined.
The lesson from these experiences is clear that development initiatives succeed not merely because they are politically popular, but because they are institutionally grounded. Public administration works best when government programs are aligned with the mandates of existing institutions, thus it is a bit counterintuitive to have a separate ‘’yellow machine Board’’ when there is a ministry already that possesses the technical staff, engineering expertise, and institutional structure necessary to manage road construction equipment.
From a policy perspective, the question is not whether the yellow machines are necessary, they undoubtedly are, but whether creating a new administrative body is the most efficient way to manage them.
Several structural risks therefore confront the Yellow Machines Board if these concerns remain unaddressed. First, the establishment of the Board is likely to expand the government payroll, as it would require the creation of a separate administrative structure with its own layers of staffing and overheadcosts. In late February, I came across a Public Service Announcement listing 19 vacancies across departments, units, and key roles under the Yellow Machines Board of Authority. If this does not reflect a troubling disregard for our pressing “bread and butter” challenges and already strained budget, then it is difficult to describe it as anything other than misplaced priority. Secondly, and very cardinal, the structure may introduce bureaucratic complexity. Infrastructure operations often require quick technical decisions, especially considering our seasonal challenges exacerbated by climate change. Additional governance layers could slow response times and precision.
Third, there is the risk of politicizing the deployment and utilization of the machines. Infrastructure resources of this scale should serve national development priorities rather than the visibility of individual political actors. The administration of heavy road construction equipment functionstypically involves expertise in civil engineering, mechanical systems, logistics management, and infrastructure planning. These are highly technical functions normally handled by engineers, infrastructure specialists, and seasoned public works administrators.
When individuals whose careers have primarily been rooted in politics or legislative service are placed at the forefront of such a technically demanding initiative, it inevitably raises questions about whether technical competence or political considerations guided the appointments. The administration of the yellow machine is not meant to be carried out in adays or week-long conferences or symposium. It needs individuals with the technical grit to execute with above-the-roof precision.
Large public infrastructure projects often carry significant political visibility. Road construction projects are highly visible to citizens, and the presence of heavy machinery in communities can easily become associated with political actors or government officials. When such resources are not firmly anchored within professional and statutoryinstitutions, there is always a risk that their deployment could be influenced by political considerations. For example, decisions about where machines are deployed could potentially prioritize politically strategic locations rather than areas of greatest infrastructural need. Communities might begin to perceive infrastructure development not as a national service but as a political reward. Even if such outcomes are not intended, the perception of political influence can undermine public trust in the initiative.
Beyond this, there is also a hidden perception that cannot be ignored. In many corners of discussion, it has been surmised that at least two members of the leadership team may likely seek elected office in the 2029 elections. If that eventuality materializes, their political success could become closely linked to their stewardship of the Yellow Machines initiative. In a recent discussion, a professional colleague of mine conjectured: “Newton, at least two of the top leaders of the Yellow Machines Board of Authority will likely contest the 2029 elections, and their appointments may well have been designed by the President as a strategic boost to their political careers.” As much as his believe could be akin to one from the belly of a Paranoia, it carries weight of truththat cannot be easily dismissed.
It is important to caution, that despite these reservations, none of these concerns above should overshadow the potential benefits of the yellow machines’ initiative. As we all know, Liberia urgently needs improved road infrastructure, and the government’s efforts to address this challenge deserve recognition. However, successful development initiatives require more than equipment and funding. They require sound institutional design, transparency, and clear accountability mechanisms.
A More Sustainable Policy Approach could be rather than creating parallel structures, but ratherstrengthening existing institutions. The Ministry of Public Works of Liberia already possesses the legal authority and technical mandate to manage national road infrastructure. A practical alternative might include establishing a National Road Equipment Management Unit within the Ministry, supported by transparent procurement, maintenance systems, and independent oversight mechanisms, and if possible, a doted-line reporting responsibility to the office of the president through the President Delivery Unit (PDU).Such an approach would build institutional capacity while ensuring that the machines remain firmly embedded within Liberia’s permanent governance framework.
About the author: Emmanuel Nyonneo Newton is a Lawyer In-Training at the Liberia School of Law pursuing JD in law, an Ex-Big 4 Auditor, Compliance & Procurement Professional. Newton has an MSc in Development Finance and a Level IV CIPS student.
